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Lieutenant Commander James Farrant, Royal Navy 
The Gaza FloTilla incidenT and The  
Modern law oF Blockade
 The law and operational practice of blockade were considered all but dead by many in the 1990s.1 However, in recent years, Israel has employed blockade 
twice: in 2006 against Hezbollah in south Lebanon and since then against Hamas 
in Gaza. The latter blockade, which will be the focus of this article, was instituted 
in January 2009 to prevent arms and other materials reaching Hamas and thereby 
to halt rocket attacks against Israeli territory.2
In May 2010, a flotilla of six ships gathered in the eastern Mediterranean with 
the declared purpose of publicly breaching the blockade. Mavi Marmara was the 
largest ship in the flotilla. It carried activists from the Free Gaza Movement and 
the Turkish charity Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humani-
tarian Relief (IHH), others sympathetic to the circumstances of the people of 
Gaza, and numerous journalists. IHH’s reputation 
has been described as “checkered,” with reported 
links to Islamic extremist organizations, including 
Al Qaeda.3 In a series of communications culmi-
nating late on 30 May 2010, Israel told the flotilla 
that unless it diverted to Ashdod, an Israeli city to 
the north of Gaza, and allowed its cargo to be in-
spected and distributed under Israeli control, per-
sonnel of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would 
board the vessels and prevent them from reaching 
the Gaza coast. The flotilla refused to divert; the 
IDF intercepted and boarded the ships sixty-four 
nautical miles outside the declared blockade zone. 
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Five of the vessels were captured without loss of life. The case of Mavi Marmara 
was different: on that ship nine civilian activists were killed during clashes be-
tween them and the IDF boarding party. 
Mavi Marmara had sailed from Turkey, and all of those killed had Turkish 
nationality. Turkey was a loud critic of the IDF’s alleged heavy-handedness and 
of the blockade generally. Turkish criticism after the incident centered on the 
following claims: that Israel did not have the legal right to establish a blockade; 
that even if a blockade could have been lawfully established, on the facts it was 
unlawful because of the disproportionate suffering inflicted on the inhabitants 
of Gaza; and that in any event, the IDF boarding team used excessive force in 
carrying out the boarding.4
Three significant panels of inquiry have investigated the incident; facts found 
and legal conclusions reached varied greatly. Israel’s inquiry was led by a justice 
of the Israeli Supreme Court—Justice emeritus Jacob Turkel.5 The Turkel Com-
mission’s report is a comprehensive analysis of the law and facts, and it attempts 
to adopt an objective tone. It nonetheless concludes that the Israeli blockade was 
lawful as a matter of international law and that the Israeli enforcement operation 
was in the main similarly lawful. The Turkish national Commission of Inquiry 
included representatives from the prime minister’s office and other offices of 
state.6 The weight of the Turkish report’s analysis and conclusions is, in the 
opinion of the author, diminished because of its transparent political motivation. 
It concludes the blockade was unlawful and that the Israeli boarding operation 
(which it describes as an “attack”) used excessive force. Both these reports were 
provided to the United nations secretary-general, who established his own com-
mission, headed by Sir Geoffrey Palmer, to consider the incident.7 The Palmer 
report takes into account the findings of the two national inquiries and concludes 
that while the establishment of the blockade was lawful, the Israeli boarding op-
eration appeared to use excessive force in dealing with the passengers and crew 
of Mavi Marmara. 
Three years on, the incident remains a valuable case study, because it raises legal 
issues on several levels. At the grand strategic, when will the international com-
munity tolerate the imposition of a blockade, and when will states accept conse-
quent interference with the navigational rights of vessels flying their flags? At the 
operational, how far from the blockaded coast should the naval commander be 
prepared to enforce the blockade? At the tactical, what level of force is acceptable 
for the individual members of a blockade-enforcement boarding party to use? 
This article will consider the incident anew and use it to establish some principles 
that might guide maritime doctrine on the future establishment and enforcement 
of blockades.
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DiD israel Have tHe rigHt to establisH a blockaDe?
The law of blockade is part of the law of naval warfare, a body of law that does 
not come into effect until there is an international armed conflict (IAC)—that 
is, a conflict between two or more states. In contrast, a non-international armed 
conflict (nIAC) is a conflict between a state and an organized armed group.8 The 
law of naval warfare does not apply in a nIAC, except when both the state party 
in the nIAC and other states not involved in the conflict have recognized the 
organized armed group as a “belligerent.”9
For an IAC to exist, two or more states must have resorted to force between 
themselves, and the level of that force must be of sufficient magnitude to be 
considered an “armed conflict.”10 The Gaza situation challenges the first of these 
“threshold” requirements. Despite aspirations to the contrary, Palestine is not a 
state; neither is Gaza. That ought to be the end of the matter, but many states, aid 
agencies, and scholars classify the conflict in Gaza as an IAC.11 They justify this 
position using three main grounds. 
The first is known as the “border crossing” argument. Because the armed 
conflict is occurring beyond Israel’s borders, it must, so the argument goes, be 
“international.” The Israeli Supreme Court has ruled to this effect;12 further, the 
Turkel Commission has classified the situation as an IAC on this basis.13 
However, the position appears inconsistent with prior practice. For instance, 
Israel itself argued that the armed conflict it fought with Hezbollah in Lebanese 
territory in 2006 was a nIAC.14 The United States does not maintain that its war 
against Al Qaeda is an IAC simply because it occurs abroad. As these examples 
illustrate, the mere crossing of a border does not of itself render a conflict 
“international.”
The second is the “occupation” argument. nIACs occur primarily on the 
territories of the states against which the organized armed groups are fighting. 
Since it would be illogical to suggest that a state can occupy its own territory, oc-
cupation must be limited to international armed conflict. If, at the material time, 
Israel occupied Gaza, the conflict must have been international in character. The 
Turkish report concluded that Gaza was under occupation by Israel and adopted 
this argument.15
However, the premise that Gaza is “occupied” is questionable. The legal test 
for occupation is twofold: an absence of government or authority and the pres-
ence of a putative occupying power in a position to substitute its own authority 
for that of a former government (leading to a situation of effective control by 
the occupying power).16 Since implementation of the policy of disengagement 
in September 2005, the Supreme Court of Israel has determined that Israel is no 
longer an occupying power.17 Indeed, the Turkel Commission found in its report 
(page 52) that “the very lack of control over the land territory in the Gaza Strip 
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. . . is what makes an external naval blockade necessary to control access to and 
egress from that territory.”
others have argued that while Israel may have no permanent military pres-
ence within Gaza or any control over the elected government, it exercises such 
control of the territory’s borders that it must be considered to have “effective 
control” over the whole territory.18 They point to Gaza’s dependence on Israel for 
such essential services as water and electricity. But dependence in any respect is 
not determinative of “occupation.” So it is submitted here that the “occupation” 
argument does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that Israel and Gaza were 
parties to an IAC.19
Third is the “special case” argument. The Palmer report concluded (page 41) 
that Gaza is a unique case, the facts of which are unlikely to be repeated else-
where in the world. It suggests that because the conflict has “all the trappings of 
an international armed conflict,” it should be treated as one.20 The conclusion that 
the conflict “should” rather than “must” be treated as an IAC could be viewed as 
tantamount to acceptance that it is not, as a matter of current law, within that 
categorization.
Accordingly, these three arguments may not between them afford a satisfac-
tory reason to forgo fulfillment of the “states parties” criterion, and this article 
doubts that the conflict in Gaza is an IAC.
The suggestion that the conflict is international in character can equally be 
rebutted by demonstrating that it is instead non-international. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia set forth in the Prosecutor v. Tadic 
case the accepted criteria for qualification as a non-international armed conflict: 
“a [non-international] armed conflict exists whenever there is . . . protracted 
armed violence between government authorities and organized armed groups, 
or between such groups within a State.”21
Accordingly, whether the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza in 2009–
10 (the operating period of the blockade prior to the Gaza flotilla incident) was 
non-international depends on the existence of, first, an organized armed group, 
and second, protracted armed violence.
Hamas is undeniably an “organized armed group.” It was sufficiently organized 
at the material time to be able to coordinate extensive smuggling of arms and to 
conduct sustained rocket attacks against Israeli territory. It seems equally uncon-
troversial that the level of armed violence between Hamas and Israel had been 
“protracted.” The word “protracted” can reflect either “intensity” or “duration” or 
both. According to Israeli figures, in 2009 there were 692 rocket/mortar attacks 
from Gaza on Israel’s territory and 104 in January–october 2010.22 estimates of 
deaths on either side may seem relatively low;23 nonetheless, the sustained rocket 
attacks and the continued Israeli policy of targeting and killing “terrorists” in 
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Gaza in 2009–10 all point to a conclusion that the violence is sufficiently signifi-
cant and sustained to be labeled “protracted.”24 This article concludes that at the 
material time there was a nIAC between Israel and Hamas.
was it a nIAC in which Israel had a right to declare a blockade? That is, was 
there a recognition of belligerency? Historically, belligerent recognition seems to 
have been required on the part both of the relevant state-party opponents in the 
nIAC and of affected neutral powers, although it did not need to be express and 
could be implied from other acts.25 During the American Civil war, for instance, 
the Union implicitly recognized the existence of a belligerency by the declaring 
of a blockade against the Confederacy. other states (most prominently Great 
Britain) implicitly recognized belligerency when they proclaimed “neutrality”—a 
proclamation that would have made no sense without an implied recognition of 
belligerency.
Some scholars suggest that the doctrine of “belligerent recognition” has fallen 
into desuetude and therefore no longer reflects the law.26 They argue that the 
twentieth-century nIACs in which blockades have (or blockade-like activity 
has) taken place do not constitute reliable state practice supporting the proposi-
tion that blockades may be established during a nIAC. In the Spanish Civil war, 
interested european powers sought to regulate the delivery of arms and material 
to the belligerents, including by sea. However, “no european state conceded to 
any party to the conflict any right to interfere with neutral shipping.”27 In 1956, 
France (when still the colonial power) established a “customs zone” off the coast 
of Algeria to prevent arms reaching rebel Algerian groups. But the French mea-
sures met with “sharp protests” from the flag states of the vessels boarded or 
diverted, and no formal blockade was ever declared.28 During the course of the 
nIAC between Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers, the Sri Lankan government took 
measures under domestic law to control the smuggling of weapons and supplies 
into Tamil territory. These measures were taken solely within territorial waters, 
and so they were not a blockade.29 The blockade enforced by Israel during its 
nIAC with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 has been held unreliable, as its context 
was not “a straight-forward nIAC.”30 
As the critics suggest, the first three examples are unreliable precedent in 
support of the contention that blockades may be established during a nIAC. 
However, it is not as easy to dismiss the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah nIAC as such a 
precedent, since it does appear to be a recent example of a nIAC in which block-
ade was employed without widespread international objection.
other scholars maintain that recognition of belligerency is still a valid legal 
concept, pointing out that mere lack of use is insufficient grounds for a conclu-
sion that a concept is no longer valid as a matter of law.31 This is the more defen-
sible position. Applied to the facts of the Israel/Hamas situation, it means that 
5
Farrant: The Gaza Flotilla Incident and the Modern Law of Blockade
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
 8 6  nAvA L  wA R  C o L L e G e  R e v I e w
Israel implicitly recognized Hamas’s belligerency by declaring the blockade. The 
attitude of the international community is harder to determine, not least because 
many consider the conflict to be an IAC, not a nIAC. However, this might be a 
reflection of the international community’s view of the intensity of the conflict 
and of the position of Hamas as a belligerent.32 If this is a plausible interpretation, 
both the state party (Israel) and third parties have implicitly recognized Hamas’s 
belligerency in the manner that occurred in respect of the Confederacy during 
the American Civil war. on this analysis, it was lawful for Israel to employ block-
ade as a method of warfare against Hamas in 2009–10.
tHe conDuct of tHe israeli blockaDe
when the flotilla was intercepted, it was sailing on the high seas—that area of 
the ocean not within the sovereign control of any state.33 In the ordinary course 
of events, vessels of every nation are entitled to enjoy the freedom of navigation 
on the high seas.34 However, states that are parties to an IAC (or a nIAC against 
an opponent whose belligerency has been recognized) may interfere with navi-
gational rights enjoyed by merchant vessels from other states in certain circum-
stances and in certain ways, including by the establishment of a blockade.35 The 
phrase “merchant vessel” refers to any vessel that is not a warship, naval auxiliary, 
or other ship on government service. “Blockade” is the blocking of the approach 
to the enemy coast or part of it for the purpose of preventing the ingress and 
egress of ships and aircraft of all states.36 To be lawful, a blockade must comply 
with a number of specific rules. 
Notification. All aspects (location, duration, etc.) of the blockade must be for-
mally announced.37 This is usually done through diplomatic channels and “no-
tices to mariners.” The notification requirement is important, because before a 
merchant vessel may be held to have “breached” a blockade, the blockading state 
must be able to prove the vessel knew or ought to have known of the blockade’s 
existence.38 
Effectiveness. A blockade must also be “effective.”39 This provision in the law of 
blockade might seem puzzling at first sight, but it has its origins in the protec-
tion of the rights of neutrals. Found in article 4 of the 1856 Declaration of Paris, 
it is grounded in the neutral concern that belligerent powers not be permitted 
wantonly to declare “paper blockades,” thereby interfering with neutral shipping, 
without the means or motive to enforce them. The requirement does not necessi-
tate interception of every blockade-runner, but sufficient military resources must 
be committed to render ingress or egress of the blockaded area “dangerous” to 
vessels attempting breach.40 The Gaza blockade was well publicized and prop-
erly notified;41 further, there is no indication that blockade-runners routinely 
breached it.42
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss3/7
 FA R R A n T  8 7
Position and Nature of the Blockading Force. The force maintaining the block-
ade may be located at a distance from the coast dependent on military require-
ments.43 There is a balance to be struck between positioning the blockading force 
so close to the coast that it may be at risk from enemy on-shore weaponry and so 
far away that the blockade may fail for want of effectiveness.44 Blockades may be 
enforced by whatever means are expedient, although there is some dispute as to 
whether a blockade may be enforced by a minefield alone. The traditional view 
has been that it cannot, because an unmanned blockade may risk unintended 
harm to, for example, a vessel in distress or one that is ignorant of the blockade 
and unwittingly stumbles into the minefield.45 A second objection is that the pre-
scribed legal penalty for breach of blockade is capture, not destruction or attack.46 
nonetheless, the rule must be construed on the basis of its object and purpose—
the prevention of unintended harm to vessels with no intention of breaching the 
blockade. So long as the means used to enforce the blockade are capable of the 
necessary judgment and distinction, there should be no breach of the law.47 war-
ships were used to enforce the Gaza blockade, so the mode of enforcement should 
not be considered contentious.
Place of Enforcement. In addition to the question of “when” (or in what circum-
stances) a blockade may be enforced, there is that of “where.” Although some 
commentators suggest that a blockade may only be enforced in the vicinity of the 
blockade line, others take the position that a state that has properly established a 
blockade may enforce it anywhere it likes, so long as it can show that the object 
vessel intends to breach the blockade.48 european powers traditionally espoused 
the more restrictive position, while traditionally expeditionary maritime powers 
such as the United States and Great Britain took the broader view.49 The cur-
rent state of the law remains unclear. U.S. navy nwP 1-14M, The Commander’s 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (July 2007) (nwP 1-14M), still ex-
pressly embraces (art. 7.7.4) the “intention” doctrine; Joint Services Publication 
383, Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004) (the UK Manual), 
is silent on the issue. The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to 
Armed Conflicts at Sea (the San Remo Manual) also offers no view on the “inten-
tion” doctrine. 
The IDF employed the doctrine to enforce the blockade sixty-four miles from 
the blockade line. even if criticism based on the intention doctrine is set aside, 
the IDF decision allowed for criticism that the blockade enforcement was too 
early and therefore demonstrated excessive force. The Turkish report criticized 
the early enforcement of the blockade, arguing it left no room for “peaceful 
and non-violent alternative measures to stop the vessels.”50 The Palmer report 
adopted a similar position.51 It is difficult to see why military necessity compelled 
the IDF to intercept the vessels so early.
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Breach and Consequences of Breach. As noted above, the penalty for breach of 
blockade is capture. Captured vessels are “prizes”;52 they must therefore be sub-
ject to later adjudication before national prize courts.53 Blockade commanders 
must tread a careful line between ensuring the blockade’s effectiveness, on the one 
hand, and not rendering their national governments liable for compensation by 
overzealous enforcement, on the other. The formula most commonly employed 
is that a vessel may be captured if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
it is breaching or attempting to breach the blockade.54 
obviously, crossing or attempting to cross the blockade line will constitute 
reasonable grounds. equally plainly, a vessel’s public declaration of intent to 
breach the blockade would be sufficient grounds. Loitering near the boundary of 
the blockaded area, failing to answer radio communications from the blockading 
force, failure to display night navigation lights, or other attempts at concealment 
would probably all constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion on the part of the 
blockade commander. In making the determination, a commander may presume 
that a vessel has knowledge of the blockade once notification has taken place.55 In 
the case of the Gaza flotilla, the vessels had publicly and repeatedly declared their 
intention to breach the blockade.56 If the “early enforcement” issue is set aside, 
there can be no doubt that the blockade force commander was within the law in 
effecting a capture of the flotilla vessels.
Resistance to Capture. A merchant vessel that “clearly resists” capture must be 
warned that it may be attacked if it persists. The legal basis for this position is that 
clear resistance to capture renders a merchant vessel a “military objective”—that 
is, a prima facie lawful target for attack.57 “Clear resistance” is a question of fact in 
each circumstance, but the threshold is a high one. Mere evasion or attempting to 
flee (without persisting in breaching the blockade) is likely not sufficient. Firing 
on the blockade force or attempting to ram a blockading warship would meet the 
threshold. even where a resisting vessel is a lawful target, before a commander 
may attack it he is obliged to weigh the likely military advantage to be obtained 
from attacking it against the number of civilian casualties the attack might collat-
erally cause. Sometimes collateral damage is an inevitable consequence of a law-
ful attack on a legitimate military objective and is thus not inherently unlawful.58 
However, the commander bears a strict duty to take all feasible measures to keep 
collateral damage to a minimum.59
what sort of military advantage might attacking the vessel confer? First is 
the important consideration that allowing a vessel to bully its way through the 
blockade line seriously calls into question the blockade’s effectiveness, especially 
if the attempt is part of a coordinated campaign to undermine the blockade. An 
ineffective blockade must be abandoned. Second, it might be known that the 
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resisting vessel is carrying cargo that will make a valuable contribution to the en-
emy’s military effort ashore. These factors would increase the military advantage 
conferred in attacking a vessel in clear breach.
Against that military advantage must be balanced the likely civilian casual-
ties. In the case of Mavi Marmara, the Turkel Commission concluded there 
were around 570 civilians on board who were not resisting the IDF’s attempts to 
board.60 If the vessel had been attacked and sunk, this would surely have been an 
unacceptable level of collateral damage, when the military advantage of prevent-
ing breach of the blockade could equally have been achieved by carrying out an 
opposed boarding, as the IDF in fact did.61
Impartiality. A blockade must be applied impartially—that is, it must be enforced 
against vessels from all states, whether neutral or belligerent.62 Accordingly, Israel 
bore not just a right but a duty to prevent the Gaza flotilla from breaching the 
blockade. The Palmer report agreed with this position.63 The Turkish report’s al-
legations that the blockade was “arbitrary, erratic and partial” are unpersuasive, 
because they are based on incidents that occurred before the blockade had been 
declared.64
Failure of a Blockade. As with the “effectiveness” rule, breach of the impartial-
ity rule renders the entire blockade void. once it becomes void, the blockading 
power must lift the blockade. Before a failed blockade is lifted, however, there is 
no rule that a merchant vessel may disobey or ignore a notified blockade because 
it unilaterally considers the blockade unlawful; it could still be subject to capture. 
However, any such capture ought to be found unlawful during subsequent prize 
proceedings and due compensation paid by the putative blockading power.
tHe effect of tHe blockaDe on tHe inHabitants of gaza 
The rules discussed so far have regulated the relationship between the blockading 
power and other ships at sea. There are three rules that seek to limit the effect a 
blockade may have on the civilian population in the blockaded territory. 
The first is an outright ban on a blockade that has as its “sole” purpose starva-
tion of civilians.65 “Sole” appears to be a very high threshold—so much so that it 
might render the starvation rule one of very limited practical application. even 
where a blockading belligerent is unscrupulous enough to impose a blockade in 
order to starve civilians, it will likely be possible to construe some other military 
advantage to the blockade that might help it evade liability under this rule. none-
theless, that is the stated and considered position (art. 7.7.2.5) of nwP 1-14M; 
it is also that of the San Remo Manual.66 The Palmer report concluded (page 42) 
that Israel had a legitimate military objective in enforcing the blockade. There 
was no evidence before any panel of inquiry that Israel’s sole (or even main) 
9
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purpose was the starvation of the population of Gaza, and so the Gaza blockade 
may not be impugned on this ground.67
The second rule is a much broader reflection of a key principle of the law of 
armed conflict, that of proportionality—a blockade is prohibited if the damage 
caused to the civil population is excessive compared to the military advantage 
conferred.68 It is clear that the sort of “damage” under contemplation in this rule is 
starvation or, perhaps more broadly, hunger.69 This once again raises the difficult 
“proportionality” judgment. what level of human suffering justifies what level 
of military advantage? In the context of the Israeli blockade of Gaza, there is the 
added complexity of distinguishing the effects of the blockade from the controls 
in place under the land-crossings policy in force ashore.70 It could be said that it 
makes little sense to try to separate the effects of the one from those of the other, 
that each should be assessed in the context of the other such that if the combined 
effects of the two policies are disproportionate to their military gain, they are 
both unlawful for want of proportionality.71 nonetheless, both the Turkel and the 
Palmer reports do distinguish the two policies’ effects: “It is wrong to impugn the 
blockade’s legality based on another, separate policy,” concludes the latter report 
(page 43, paragraph 78). 
on the facts, it is submitted here that the effects of the two policies can and 
should be sufficiently distinguished to make a proportionality judgment on each. 
The determining factor in reaching this conclusion is that Gaza has no port fa-
cilities. even prior to the establishment of the blockade, the population of Gaza 
received virtually no goods or supplies by sea.72 As regards the blockade’s military 
advantage, Israel points to a sharp reduction in rocket attacks launched from 
Gaza after the blockade began, an accomplishment that had not been achieved 
by the land-crossings policy alone before the blockade was established.73 It may 
be concluded that despite Gaza’s lack of port facilities, Hamas’s ability to resupply 
arms and other material was significantly reduced by the blockade. This article 
concludes that the blockade was not unlawful for disproportionality.
The third rule is that a blockade must not deny to the civilian population 
“items essential to its survival.”74 This would include items involved in the pro-
duction of foodstuffs and would also likely include medical supplies and maybe 
heating fuel, depending on the circumstances of the blockaded population. The 
blockading power retains the right to determine the technical arrangements for 
providing such items to the population of the blockaded territory.75 It is impor-
tant to note that because a state may lawfully make technical arrangements for 
the delivery of humanitarian aid to the blockaded territory, merchant vessels 
carrying it are obliged to abide by those technical arrangements; vessels carrying 
humanitarian aid have no right simply to sail through the blockade.76 The Israeli 
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blockade made clear provision for the supply of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Such 
supplies were to be routed through the Israeli port of Ashdod, just to the north 
of the Gaza Strip, for onward movement to Gaza via the designated land crossing 
checkpoint. The blockade itself should not be challenged on the basis that it failed 
to take account of “items essential to survival.” 
enforcement of tHe blockaDe
As noted, a vessel that “clearly resists” capture may be attacked in certain circum-
stances. The issue here, though, is how to treat a crew or passengers who resist 
the boarding team once the capture is under way. Traditionally the law of naval 
warfare did not look beyond the platform; the law of naval warfare said nothing 
about the targeting of individuals. But the principle of distinction—that only 
combatants must be the object of attack, that civilians must as far as possible 
be protected from attack—is so fundamental to the law of armed conflict that it 
would be absurd to suggest that it did not apply at sea.77 
A blockading force will be dealing almost exclusively with merchant vessels.78 
Therefore, the blockade commander’s starting point must be that individuals on 
board the object vessel are civilians protected from attack unless, and for such 
time as, they take “direct part in hostilities.”79 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross propounds the following test for whether an act amounts to “direct 
participation”: 
•	 The act must be likely to affect adversely the military operations or military 
capacity of a party to an armed conflict.
•	 There must be a direct causal link between the act done and the harm  
inflicted.
•	 That act must be specifically designed to cause directly the required thresh-
old of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of 
another.80
If a commander is satisfied on the facts that this test is met by any personnel 
resisting the boarding, it is lawful to attack them. 
of course, members of the boarding party always retain their right to use 
proportionate and necessary force in self-defense or in defense of others. This 
may include lethal force where such force is proportionate and necessary—for 
example, when there is an imminent threat to human life and there is no other 
way to extinguish the threat. In many circumstances, service personnel con-
fronted by direct participants will be justified in using force in self-defense and 
will not need to consider the more complex “direct participation” formulation. 
However, that will not always be the case, and, so as not to fetter improperly (and 
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perhaps dangerously) the discretion of blockading forces, the national command 
must consider whether to authorize rules of engagement (Roe) that also permit 
the targeting of direct participants, rather than relying solely on the self-defense 
paradigm.81 The Mavi Marmara case illustrates this position. 
The mavi marmara Boarding 
Anticipating that they would be boarded, some persons on board Mavi Marmara 
armed themselves in order physically to repel the IDF boarding party.82 The IDF 
party attempted to board by speedboat but was unable to do so due to physical 
resistance by personnel on board Mavi Marmara, resistance that included the use 
of water cannons and the throwing of objects at the speedboats.83 After the speed-
boat boarding failed, three helicopters inserted the boarding party. There were 
later reports that live fire was used from the helicopter against personnel on the 
upper deck of Mavi Marmara;84 these were denied by Israel. The first three sol-
diers to fast-rope onto the deck of Mavi Marmara were captured and taken below 
decks, where they later claimed to have been assaulted.85 During the boarding, 
Israeli forces faced armed resistance from persons on board. Israel would claim 
that firearms were used against its forces, though none were found on board 
afterward and this was denied by the activists. Before the boarding party gained 
control of the ship, nine activists were killed by firearms. The autopsies showed 
that some of the bodies had multiple bullet wounds, some inflicted from behind 
and some at close range.
There were no military personnel on board Mavi Marmara; all of the pas-
sengers and crew members were civilians. The Israeli force commander was 
obliged to make the operating assumption that all of the personnel on board 
were protected from attack unless it could be determined that they were taking a 
direct part in hostilities. The Turkel Commission devoted much time to consid-
ering (with the benefit of hindsight) which personnel on board Mavi Marmara 
were directly participating in hostilities.86 The blockade force commander would 
have had far less knowledge than the commission. However, once the speedboat 
boarding was attempted and repelled, it would have been abundantly clear that 
there were individuals on board prepared forcibly to resist the IDF boarding. If 
it could have been safely concluded that the resisting members of the crew and 
passengers were direct participants, and if these individuals could have been 
adequately identified and distinguished, there would have been no reason in 
law for them not to have been targeted with sniper fire from the helicopter prior 
to the boarding team’s insertion, as was to be alleged by the activists but denied 
by Israel. The Mavi Marmara experience therefore demonstrates circumstances 
where a “direct participation” analysis would allow a commander lawfully to use 
force in circumstances outside of self-defense.
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The Turkel Commission determined that it could not criticize the level of force 
used by the IDF in the fatal cases, because of the level of resistance demonstrated 
and the consequent challenging operating environment.87 The Palmer report 
concluded (pages 58–60) that Israel had provided insufficient evidence as to the 
circumstances of each death to allow the panel to conclude that each of the nine 
could have lawfully been targeted under the law of armed conflict (i.e., that the 
test for direct participation had been met). The panel was unpersuaded (page 61) 
that the nine had been lawfully killed in self-defense, because of the nature and 
number of the bullet wounds inflicted.
The Impact of International Human Rights Law
This assessment of applicable law would be incomplete without consideration of 
the impact of international human rights law. Some human rights law is treaty 
based, such as the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (the european Convention on Human Rights, or eCHR) or 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). whether 
their norms apply depends on whether the state enforcing the blockade is a party 
to the relevant treaty. elements of human rights law have also increasingly crys-
talized into customary law. This law remains applicable during an armed conflict. 
A state is obliged to protect the human rights of those “within its jurisdiction.”88 
The U.S. position is that this provision in human rights law means that there can 
be no application of human rights obligations outside the territory of the state.89 
on that basis, for an American commander, human rights law has no part to play 
in any operation outside U.S. territorial waters. However, this is not a widely held 
position, and both the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR and the european 
Court of Human Rights have concluded that norms can apply extraterritori-
ally. The test for whether there is jurisdiction depends on whether the state has 
“effective control” of the relevant territory.90 In multinational operations, Ameri-
can commanders must be aware that allies will be subject to additional operating 
constraints derived from human rights law.91 
In the context of the Mavi Marmara boarding operation, “effective control” of 
the vessel (vice territory) was achieved once the vessel had been captured and the 
boarding party had full control.92 Before that point, the conduct of the boarding 
was governed by the law of armed conflict alone. After that point, the IDF was 
obliged to comply with human rights norms, such as the right to freedom from 
inhuman and degrading treatment. The Turkish report criticized the IDF for 
interfering with this (and other) rights of the captured crew and passengers;93 the 
Turkel Commission considered that the IDF had employed reasonable measures 
to ensure the safety of the boarding team during the passage to Ashdod and that 
rights were not infringed.94 
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lessons iDentifieD for tHe future conDuct of  
blockaDes
The foregoing analysis allows four conclusions to be drawn, which may inform 
the future conduct of blockade operations.
Reaffirmation of the Traditional Law and Practice of Blockade. Despite a lack 
of consensus on every aspect of the law of blockade, the three investigations into 
the incident all relied on the classic law of blockade. It seems, therefore, that the 
concept of blockade is alive and well today. It is equally clear that in certain cir-
cumstances blockade can be an effective method of warfare. It deserves to retain 
its place in national doctrine.
Right to Establish a Blockade in a NIAC. It is difficult to say whether the position 
that blockade can be a lawful method of conducting a nIAC (on the part of the 
state party, at any rate) is gaining in contemporary acceptance. neither of the na-
tional reports nor the Un report concluded that the Gaza conflict was a nIAC in 
which blockade law applied; they all concluded it was an IAC. For the present au-
thor, however, Israeli practice in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2009 constitute 
contemporary examples of nIACs in which the international community was (in 
the main) prepared to tolerate the imposition of blockades. 
Employment of the Intention Doctrine. Israel’s enforcement action sixty-four 
nautical miles from the blockade zone was the subject of criticism. Belligerents 
often wish to court international support for their cause; the perception of over-
zealous enforcement of rules that might already impact heavily on neutral states’ 
trade may count against that. early enforcement may also facilitate criticism on 
the grounds of excessive force. In the case of the Gaza flotilla, what would have 
been lost militarily had the IDF waited until the flotilla was in the immediate 
vicinity of the declared blockade zone before effecting capture? Doing so would 
have made it abundantly clear that the flotilla’s actual intentions matched its rhet-
oric. even if the intention doctrine is reflective of the contemporary law, one of 
the key lessons that the Gaza flotilla incident demonstrates is that a blockade is a 
balance between what is militarily effective and what neutral states will tolerate. 
Use of Force in Blockade Enforcement Operations. During an armed conflict a 
belligerent state’s armed forces may target combatants (usually the armed forces 
of a state) and civilians who are directly participating in hostilities. whether in an 
armed conflict or not, a state’s armed forces always retain the right to use propor-
tionate and necessary force in self-defense or in defense of others, which may in-
clude lethal force where such force is proportionate and necessary. In most cases, 
vessels that breach or attempt to breach a blockade will be crewed by civilians. It 
must be assumed that unless the tests for clear resistance or direct participation 
can be met, the only force that may be employed against a vessel in breach or its 
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crew is that used in self-defense or defense of others. Because enforcement of the 
blockade is a legal right (and a duty), reasonable force to compel compliance with 
the lawful directions of the blockade force would also be permitted; it is unlikely 
that lethal force would be reasonable in those circumstances. 
Therefore the force permitted in most blockade enforcement operations will 
mirror that for the conduct of peacetime maritime security operations: coun-
terpiracy, counternarcotics, enforcement of Un arms embargoes, and the like. 
Typical Roe to achieve such a mission will be modeled on this “law enforcement” 
use of force. Force used is to be the minimum necessary in all circumstances. 
Lethal force may be employed, but only where proportionate and necessary in 
self-defense or defense of others. The Roe should contain a series of escalatory 
measures to compel a vessel to submit for boarding and inspection: a series of 
verbal warnings, warning shots, nondisabling fire, disabling fire. During the 
conduct of the boarding, crew members may be detained or restrained where 
necessary for the safety of the boarding team.
It is submitted here that this model of enforcement operation is appropriate 
for blockade enforcement. However, Roe should reflect that armed conflict rules 
continue to apply. Depending on the circumstances, a commander may need 
rapid authority to attack a vessel that clearly resists capture or to target individual 
crew members who are directly participating in hostilities. Roe issued need to 
be agile enough to reflect that need, while also retaining a politically acceptable 
level of control over the blockade force’s activity.
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